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The facts show that in the given economic environment a restructuring of the Belgian
professional football league is necessary for several reasons. First, to provide some form of
“limited” competition with other European countries. Second, the introduction of the licence
system by the Belgian Football Association in 2000-01 and by the UEFA in 2004-05, because
clubs would no longer be allowed to have debts to the social security system, inland revenue,
players,etc, Third, to stop the gradually increasing number of bankruptcies since the introduction
of the licence system. Historical reasons and conservatism  make a transition very difficult.
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1.  The institutional structure 
 
Until 1984 clubs in Belgium were like in most of the European competitions funded 
through gate receipts, commercial receipts from bars, bank loans, direct subsidies
i 
provided by national or local governments, or indirect subsidies through free use of 
community stadiums, public workers of the local government  or specific social security 
an tax laws. Professional football players are/were paying social taxes based on a 
minimum wage (€1186.31 a month in 2004/05) and not on the real amount.of their 
incomes
ii and "Black money" from local businessmen evading taxes. Andreff & 
Staudohar(2002:25) refer to this way of financing as the traditional Spectator-Subsidies-
Sponsors-Local or SSSL-model 
 
In 1984 the Brussels District Attorney Bellemans investigated the business of pro 
football clubs. When the investigation was done a bribery scandal was disclosed, several 
players suspended and all the clubs were fined heavily by the tax authorities. As a result 
banks became very reluctant to grant additional loans to clubs. Smaller clubs had trouble 
finding money and a new entity was introduced by KV Mechelen's owner (the late) John 
Cordier (Telindus-Mobistar): the "invest(ment) company". An investment company iwas 
a business model to keep players as property in a different business unit; . Investors - 
mostly rich fans/supporters with money to spend - were given the guarantee that they 
would profit when the assets (the players) were sold. This business model disappeared 
with the Bosman ruling. At this present moment only three of the 18 Belgian clubs in the 
Jupilerliga, the Belgian First Division, are limited liability companies. Anderlecht is the 
only Belgian club that has been thinking about becoming a Public Limited Company. 
That occurred in the beginning of the nineties when the plan existed to float the club on 




2. The Belgian football: success on the pitch and financial problems 
 
Since 1982 only three teams have played all seasons in the first division (SC Anderlecht, 
Club Brugge and Standard Luik). Nine other teams spent in that period at least fifteen 
years in the first division. This means that the Belgian professional football competition 
is, like all the other European football competitions, not an example of competitive 
balance
iv. Every year there is a “battle” for the places 5 to 18. In the season 2002/03 SC 
Lokeren(3th), St-TruidenVV(4
th) and SK Lierse(5
th) were the revelations. The problem 
was that the salaries that they had to pay were higher than was budgeted. In other terms 
the marginal revenues of success were lower than the marginal costs. The result was a 
cash flow problem and a deficit at the end of the year. To solve the problem the clubs had 
to sell their most valuable players.  In SC Lokeren the chairman had to sink new private 
money into the club, St-Truiden VV had some problems but found with Duchatelêt
v a 
very rich sponsor. In September 2003 SK Lierse had to sell Huysegems(to AZ Alkmaar) 
and Arouna Kone(Roda JC Kerkrade), their best players,. This transformation of active 
into cash was only to create some cash flow and didn’t solve the structural financial   2
problems. In December 2004 SK Lierse was almost bankrupt and they asked the city of 
Lier for support. The city council demanded the financial books of the club and they 
noticed that in the season 2002/03 the expenditure on wages was 100% of turnover and 
the selling of the two “star players” resulted in 2003/04 in a decline to 82%. The total 
debt was estimated at 7 million euro on a turnover of 5 million euro/year. The club 
proposed to the city to buy the stadium but with only 35,000 inhabitants this would be 
about 20% of the public budget. The solution as usual was the arrival of a financier who 
put 3million euro in the club to pay the short term debts to players, taxes and social 
security and the city froze the intrest payments on an old 4 million euro loan and took 
over a one million euro loan to the Dexiabank. The city covered its old loan and the new 
one in case of bankrupty of SK Lierse with a claim on the stadium which has an 
estimated value of 6.6 million euro.  In 2003/04 Moeskroen(5
th) was the revelation. The 
result was an exodus of players at the end of that and in the current season
vi. In december 
2004 the short term debt of the club was estimated at 5 million euro and rumours of 
bankrupty emerged in the press.  AA La Louvière, a club with a turnover of 2.5 million 
euro had already 29 points after the first round(17 games). Statistics shows us that with 
32-35 points relegation can be avoided. Goane, the chairman of the team, declared in the 
press that the club couldn’t support a team that gained to many points, in other words the 
marginal costs for gaining a lot of extra points was higher than the marginal revenues(the 
raise in attendances was only 500 spectators). The solution was the selling of some of its 
human capital, its players. The club sold Klukowski and Ishiaku went to FC Brugge, 
Assou-Ekotto to Standard Liège and Murcy to the Danish club Esjberg.  The general 




3. History and culture 
 
In Europe and Belgium, prior to the 1990s, the objective of the professional football 
clubs was to provide entertainment by achieving playing success while remaining solvent 
and not to maximise profit. Sloane(1971) indicated that profit-making clubs in Europe 
have been the exception and not the rule. Chairmen, directors and patronages with a 
controlling function in the football clubs first reached success in other business fields. 
Their motives to invest in sports were more a desire for prestige, power or sporting 
enthusiasm and can be seen as a form of philanthropy. They get the best seats and a 
chance to mix with people in similar positions as themselves. Profit seems unlikely to be 
a motivation factor. The pursuit of playing success is the main objective and the clubs 
can be defined as win(sportive profit) maximisation oriented.  
 
The Bellemans raid in 1984 proved that Belgium football was infested by tax evasion 
money. Until 1984 Belgium had been a paradise for foreign players. In the seventies Rob 
Rensenbrink and Arie Haan, two of the best players of one of the best national teams in 
the world- the Netherlands -, played in the Belgian League. The sensation of the World 
Cup 74 - Emmanuel Sanon of Haiti - was transferred to Belgium. Lato and Lubanski of 
the great Polish squad played in Belgium, together with Preben Elkjaer-Larsen one of the 
greatest Danish players ever. In the season 75-76, 34 out of 97 foreign players in 
Belgium were Dutch. The Bosman ruling abolished the existing transfer system and 
liberated the professional footballers from their peculiar status as employees not entitled 
to sell their labour to the highest bidder once their contract of employment came to an 
end. The result was a drastic change of the labour market. Before Bosman, the clubs had 
monopsony powers and kept wages low. After Bosman the power switched over to the 
players. The combination of this change with the win maximization objectives of the   3
clubs and the exploding TV rights in the big sports and broadcast markets of the UK, 
Spain, Italy, Germany  and in a lesser degree France and the Netherlands, resulted in very 
high salaries. These changes in the economic environment lead to an exodus of talent out 
of the smaller market of the Belgian competition. The changing structure of the origin of 
the foreign players support this statement. This season there are 173 foreign players in 
Belgium, only 3 are Dutch. The migration pattern between the Netherlands and Belgium 
shows an opposite evolution, where the higher wages in the Dutch competition can be 
seen as the main power of attraction.(Wheatheril,1999;Vandeweghe, 2003;Dejonghe, 
2004b) 
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4. Change in the 1990s 
 
The changing structure of European professional football made that most of the European 
top clubs no longer have the structure of the SSSL model. The rising impact of television 
and media companies and the emerging interest of multinationals corporations on 
professional football gave rise to a professional management approach, but did not bring 
financial stability. Another change was the use of the ability of the new investors to 
mobilize additional funding for further growth. According to Andreff & 
Staudohar(2002:31-33) the new owners implemented forms of vertical integration in the 
industry and created synergisms as a result of the interaction between business and sport. 
The result is an evolution from the SSSL model to the more global oriented Media-
Corporations-Merchandising-Markets or MCCM-model.  
 
Professional football has been transformed to a person-related immaterial consumer-
oriented service with a short-term utility and an economic function. (Dejonghe, 2001: 
289-293). This definition implies that in a closed product market only densely populated 
locations combined with a high rate of centrality can sustain a professional club. This 
transition implies that clubs in countries and cities with a small population have a 
competitive disadvantage. Market orientation, as a main causation if applied to an 
economic product, leads to a situation of cumulative cycles. High attendance leads to 
more income from sponsors and media, that can be invested in players which in turn 
leads to better results and higher attendance, etc. The long-term success of professional 
football can be seen as an endogenous demand-oriented growth model based on 
Myrdalls’ cumulative causation process. The central item is market potential and 
Belgium, with only 10 million inhabitants cannot compete with the larger countries.  
 















The economic objective is that total gate receipts, income from advertising, commercial 
inflow, television and other media earnings have to be maximised for the economic 
product “the league”. In Belgium where there were no major changes in the governance 
structure of football in the 1990s, the SSSLmodel still dominates the league. The result 
was a sudden spectacular decline of Belgium from a 3
rd place in the UEFA-ranking in 
1993 to a 20
th place in 2000 and a recovery to a more “normal” 9
th place in 2004.  
 
The Belgian league declined from a central competition before 1995 to a secondary, semi 
peripherical competition and a “stepping stone” for players from outside the EU. The 
minimum wages in Belgium for non-EU players in 1995 was about €25,000. De Decker 
and Wille, two senators of the Flemish Liberal Party VLD
vii were the founding fathers of 
the proposal that raised the minimum wage to 8 times the minimum wage of nowadays 
€61,632
viii. The existence of the severe restrictions for non-EU players in the UK and the 
Netherlands
ix made Belgian clubs interesting for cooperation. Some clubs sought and 
found cooperation deals with major clubs abroad. FC Antwerp - Manchester United, VC 
Westerlo – Chelsea/Feyenoord, SV Brugge-Blackburn Rovers and SK Beveren with 
Arsenal. SK Beveren teamed up with Arsenal in 2000, but in 2002 was overtaken by a 
French former international active in Ivory Coast with ASEC Mimos Abidjan and the 
local soccer youth development academy. This Mr. Guillou was a personal friend of 
Arsène Wenger, the Arsenal manager. As it turned out, this African school now owns 
Beveren, a two time Belgian champion. Beveren has 18 players from Ivory Coast. Some 
of them were sold in the winter of 2003-04. Two players were shipped to Metallurg 
Donetsk and one went to Arsenal. Roughly one third of the transfer money remained in 
the club, one-third went to Mr. Guillou and one third was for a company called Goal, a 
joint venture reportedly owned by local business people.  
 
The result is as shown in table 3 that similar to other competitions in Europe, the relative 
impact of foreign players has grown. Another example, and more typical for the Belgian 
case is that a vast majority of the foreign players now come from sub-Saharan Africa(the 
secondary countries of that part of the world) or former Yugoslav republics, a 
consequence of the stepping stone theory. The recent increase in French players can be 
explained by a new taxation rule. Players living in France, Germany, Greece or the US 
and playing in Belgium for no more than 4 years have to pay a mere 18% final income 
tax on their wages. The result is an increase of French players from the lower French 
divisions in the Belgian competition.
x  5
 
Table1: The origin of foreign players in the Belgian First Division 
 
COUNTRY  OF  ORIGIN  1982/83 1994/95 2004/05 
FOREIGNERS 










Rest East/Centr Europa 





















































































Source: Dejonghe(2004b) based onVoetbal Magazine, 1982;1994;2005 
 
5. General financial/commercial position 
 
Clubs in Belgium are most of the time organized as non-profit organizations and not 
obliged to publish their annual accounts nor do tax authorities investigate them. This law 
changed in 2004 and from this year on the VZW-ASBL(non profit)-clubs will have to 
publish yearly results and an annual report. . 
 
The general financial position of clubs as stated by the Profliga is that 2 out of 18 clubs 
reached a break even, meaning that 16 out of 18 posted a loss. One or more wealthy club 
fans often close this budget gap. The total budget of the 18 clubs in the Jupiler League 
2004/05 was 126 million euro, with 71 million euro for the 4 biggest clubs. The relation 
between revenue and success on the field has already been a topic for research. All the 
studies showed a positive and significant relation. In most of the countries the correlation 
fluctuates between 0.6 and 0.9 and it is rising. In Belgium the correlation in the period 
1999/2000 – 2003/04 was on average 0.65. 
 
 




































Source: Voetbal Magazine(2005) 
 
The principal sources of income in the seventies and eighties used to be ticketing (70%) 
and commercial income (30%).Nowadays TV rights in the smaller European competition 
count for only 13%, commercial income for 53%, ticketing for 35%. This is the major 
difference with the big 5 leagues where TV rights generate half of their income. The best 
performing Belgian teams can look forward to 0.8 million euros TV money per season. 
The financially best performing English team, Manchester United gets 83.6 million euros 
from broadcasting rights(Deloitte,2004)  
 
Table 5: Revenue sources in the European football competitions 
 
COUNTRY TICKETING  TV-RIGHTS  SPONSORING  MERCHANDISING, 
CATERING,… 
England 29%  44%  27%  - 
Italy 18%  55% 15%  12% 
Spain 25%  51%  9%  15% 
Germany 17%  33%  30%  20% 
France 15% 52%  20%  13% 
       
Average 20%  48%  20%  12% 
       
Portugal 42%  20%  18%  20% 
The Netherlands  34% 12%  41%  12% 
Scotland 42%  23%  35%  - 
Denmark 17%  4%  43%  36% 
Norway 40%  4%  43%  13% 
Sweden 33% 14%  28%  25% 
Belgium 30% 12%  58% 
       
Average 35%  13%  35%      18% 
Source : Deloitte & Touche(2002;2003 ;2004)Dejonghe(2004b) 
 
 
Belgian TV rights have, as you can see from figure 4, more than doubled in the last ten 
years to 15 million euro
xi.The Belgian football competition had/has the disadvantage of 
the given TV market with few players. Belgium as “one market” does not exist in the 
media. The country of ten million is divided in two language regions, 6 million in 
Flanders and Brussels(Dutch-speaking) and 4 million in Walloonia an Brussels(French-
speaking). Each region has its own broadcasting stations. In Flanders there are two 
serious players in the market; the publicly funded VRT and the commercial VTM. In 
Flanders VTM has held the TV contracts since 1994. VRT holds everything else   7
(Champions League, cycling, Olympics). During the last bidding process VRT did not 
participate with a serious offer, leaving the Profliga with only one broadcasting station to 
negotiate with. The French speaking market has only one player, the public broadcaster 
RTBF. The same occurred in the pay TV market, where only Canal+ exists. Pay Per 
View is not a Belgian concept and Internet or other modern media rights are unheard of. 
 

































































Source: Vandeweghe(2003a); Voetbal Magazine(2005) 
 
 VTM and RTBF each paid 2.6 million euro and Canal + 9.8 million euro. The Belgian 
FA collected 8.497% of that money as a sort of contribution(tax). 75% of the rest is 
divided proportionally and the other 25% is divided as “merit fees” and “facility fees” 
 
6. Financial instability 
 
In the season 2000-2001 the football league installed a licence commission under 
pressure from the federal government. Clubs with debts to the league, the tax or social 
authorities, or players and other clubs, were refused a licence. Debts to other parties were 
not taken into account.
xii The reason for this change in policy was a more strict control 
by the national financial authorities after reports in parliament about the social security 
debts of soccer clubs. The last five years some clubs have experienced financial 
difficulties and disappeared. Some of them (E. Aalst now changed in a new “vzw” Aalst 
2002), KV Mechelen, KV Kortrijk and FC Turnhout) were placed into a lower division 
by the licence committee, disappeared(RC Harelbeke) or merged with another team.(SK 
Lommel with FC Overpelt, RWD Molenbeek merged with FC Strombeek and became, 
because the Brussels Capital Government subsidizes clubs with the name Brussels in it, 
FC Brussels)  
 
In the season 2002-2003 two teams went into liquidation KV Mechelen was a non-profit 
organisation.. Under Belgian law is it impossible for a vzw to go bankrupt. The vzw goes 
into voluntary or compulsory liquidation and is placed into receivership. The receiver 
dissolves the “non profit organisation” by selling its assets. KV Mechelen was relegated 
from the first division to the third division because they had no debts to the Belgian 
Football Association. KV Mechelen was eventually saved by a national TV star who 
managed to raise extra finance. Today they are playing in third division with a lot of 
“old” professional players and they “rent” their stadium from the old vzw. Lommel could 
not pay its debts to the KBVB and was consequently taken out of competition
xiii but   8
merged in 2003/04 with a third division club. Darwinism was the name of the game. 
Another problem in Belgium is that the “sport” are a regional matter and Brussels, 
Flanders and Wallonia have their own minister and way of subsidizing sports. In 
Flanders the government doesn’t interfere when clubs are on the edge of bankruptcy. The 
support for teams in the southern part of Belgium since 1994 has been disguised in the 
form of subsidies to build and modernise the stadiums. Mons is the city of the Socialist 
chairman Elio Di Rupo and the local government donated 7 million euros to “modernise” 
the stadium.  SC Charleroi was almost bankrupt but the minister-president of Walloonia 
Van Cauwenberghe, an inhabitant of the city, made it possible that the Walloon region 
subsidized 6.2 million euro for the stadium. Moeskroen(home to a Catholic politician) 
and La Louvière collected 4.4 million and 3.2 million euro. The result is that clubs in the 
south of Belgium can transfer the rest of their budget to salaries. A lot of Flemish teams 
have to rent or to pay off the loans for their stadium.  
 
7. Belgian football : Conclusion and future 
 
Another and very crucial question that can be asked after we have seen the recent 
evolution in the European professional football environment is “Is there a need for a 
professional football league in Belgium?” If the answer to this question is affirmative 
then an economic analysis is necessary. The situation today in Belgium is: 
 
-  An average attendance of 9,500 spectators in the last few years 
-  About 50% of the spectators go to 4 clubs 
-  Broadcasting rights of €15 million for season 2003-2004 
-  Lack of international impact and the associated income loss from demand 
oriented broadcasting rights 
-  Total budget of the first division (18 teams) is only €133 million 
-  No barriers between professional and amateur football 
-  Teams on the edge of bankruptcy and heavy debts 
-  No extra financial input from the European market 
 
The increasing impact of the economic principles on football results in a classification of 
the clubs in (inter)national and local ones, for which a survival on the long term the 
economic spatial potentials have to be analysed. The central topic or the necessary 
minimal conditions are in this case the presence of potential fans and the willingness of 
the local firms, industry and government to invest in the club and its infrastructure. This 
concept results in a perception in which professional football and the urban hierarchical 
and spatial structure are interdependent. Belgium is too small a market to support 
eighteen pro teams. 13 of these 18 teams play in the Flemish market. The other five 
teams draw their fans from the 4 million French-speaking Belgians.Whenever the future 
of Belgian football is discussed, two solutions are always brought up: 
 
1. decrease the number of clubs to 16, 14 or even 12 
2. make an BENE-league, being an international league with the Netherlands.
xiv
3. make the product market “European” so that Belgian top teams can compete with the 
teams from the big leagues (a kind of Euro League based on the American system) 
 
The problem being the TV revenues, one can easily calculate how the team revenues 
would benefit from a bigger TV contract. Decreasing the number of clubs could possibly 
double the TV revenues for the big market teams, and especially (SC Anderlecht) 
Brussels(1.6 million euros instead of 0.8 million) would benefit , but this would hardly   9
influence the total revenue the way the Champions League does. For the Belgian clubs 
participating in the CL is crucial and can represent up to 40 % of the yearly revenues.  
 
Dejonghe(2001;2004a) created an location-allocation model for the existing situation in 
Belgian professional football. A football club playing in the first division can be seen as a 
hierarchical marginal good that is, because of the exogenous limit of 18 clubs, an 
indicator of an urban hierarchical level
xv. The transformation of professional football to a 
market/consumer-oriented service in a closed product market implies the presence of a 
market that reaches a certain “threshold”. 13 of the 23 Belgian clubs that have been 
playing in the first division since 1997 are the owner of a market of less than 200,000 
potential consumers, a number that in the long term is not enough to support a 
professional football club that can compete with Belgian top clubs or maybe with the 
European clubs. The problem with professional football in Belgium is not only a 
location-allocation problem, but for international competition it is also a matter of too 
many clubs in a limited market and the high international thresholds in the most 
successful football countries. In comparison with the dominating countries in the 
Champions League and the UEFA-cup, the average market in Belgium is with 550,000 
for every first division club a lot smaller than the averages of the most successful 
countries. In Germany there is one first division club for every 4.6 million inhabitants, in 
England, France and Italy one for every 3 million, in Spain one for every 2 million and 
even in The Netherlands there is only one for every 830,000 inhabitants 
.  
 
The first results of this study were published in 2000(Vandeweghe, 2000) and created a 
storm of protest in the football world. Today, march 2005, we can confront the results of 
our research with the existing situation. RWDMolenbeek, RC Harelbeke, and SK 
Lommel, three clubs without any future in the model were expulsed from the football 
competition. KV Kortrijk, in line of he model had to merge with Harelbeke and the 
second division club Waregem, and E Aalst, a club that on the basis of empirical data had 
no future in the first division, were relegated to the third division. KV Mechelen, which 
according to the model had to merge with Lierse, went into receivership and was placed 
in the third division. SK Lierse has because of their debts to Social Security, inland 
revenues and others, yearly recurring  problems with their licence. These findings result 
shows that a theoretical model based on empirical data can be of some use to the real 
world but in the short term, subjective arguments can be used to postpone reality.  
 
Modest solidarity still existing among the 18 first division clubs in Belgium is under 
pressure. On the one hand, the two top teams, Bruges and Anderlecht are anxious to keep 
up with Europe. On the other hand, they need their own Mickey Mouse league to qualify 
for the European Champions League. Anderlecht is on the verge of becoming a G14 
member. Once a permanent European competition stage created, the major Belgian clubs 
are bound to break away, leaving the others behind. From a theoretical viewpoint a 
European Superleague in an open product market with a form of revenue sharing 
between the teams is the ideal situation but this dream is something for the (far or 
nearby?) future.  
 
These facts show that in the given economic environment a restructuring of the Belgian 
professional football league is necessary for some reasons: 
  
-  To provide some form of “limited” competition with other European countries    10
-  The introduction of the licence system by the Belgian Football Association in 
2000-01 and by the UEFA in 2004-05, because clubs would no longer be allowed 
to have debts to the social security system, inland revenue, players,etc 
-  To stop the gradually increasing number of bankruptcies since the introduction of 
the licence system 
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i The poorest Belgian province – Henegouwen/Hainaut, a province receiving financial support from the EU 
– has today still 4 top division clubs. Local authorities and often politicians such as the socialist mayor and 
chairman of the Wallonian Socialist Party Elio Di Rupo(AEC Mons), the minister-president of the 
Walonian government and socialist Jean Claude Van Cauwenbergh(SC Charleroi) and the mayor of 
Moeskroen Jean-Pierre Detremmerie(Wallonian Catholic Party) heavily support their club. 
ii Based on a total wage bill of 81 million euros for the Jupiler League and 450 players (Vandeweghe and 
RSZ, VLEKHO course 2003), the social taxes paid by the clubs should be (for any other business than 
sports) 33,3 million euros, In stead, the social taxes paid are 2,4 million euros. The average subsidy per 
club by the government amounts to 1.85 million euros. .Foreign players with fiscal status of non-inhabitant 
pay since 2002 only 18 % tax 
iii In 1984 Anderlecht won against Nottingham Forest in a European Cup game, thanks to a dubious penalty 
given by the Spanish referee Muro. In 1997 it was disclosed that Anderlecht had given 25.000 euro to the 
referee. All this time the go-betweens of 1984 had been blackmailing the Anderlecht president Constant 
Vanden Stock. Anderlecht was kicked out of the European competitions, but appealed before the TAS in 
Lausanne and won the case. But damage was done. 
iv In the period 1961-2004 SC Anderlecht won 19 times the championship, FC Brugge 11 times and 
Standard Liège 7 times or together 84% of the championships. Dejonghe(2004b) used the differences in the 
year-to-year rankings to measure the dynamic competitive balance for the periods 1999/2000 – 2003/04 in 
Belgium and compared it to other European competitions. The average dynamic competitive value was 
0.40. The evolution in time showed us an increase from 0.31 in 1999/2000 to 0.49 in 2003/04. The 
conclusion could be that Belgian football competition became more dynamic balanced but the real reason 
is the convergence in budgets between the smaller club 
v Roland Duchatelêt is the founder of Melexis, a company on the stock market with a market capitalisation 
value of 4,2 billion euro and of the political party Vivant, which is now “part” of the Liberal Party in 
Flanders. 
vi Mbo Mpenza(Belgian international) and Christophe Gregoire(january 2005) went to SC Anderlecht, 
Luigi Pieroni (28 goals in 2003/04) to Auxerre, Steve Dugardein(Caen) and Stephen Laybutt(AAGent) 
vii The reason for their intervention was the abuse of mostly young African players by their “agents”. The 
commission Internal Affairs decided that a raise of the minimum salary for non-EU players could be used 
as a weapon against these practices.  
viii Ivo Belet (member of the European parlement Christian Democratic Party) and Dirk Claes (Member of 
the federal chamber) are going to propose(somewhere in 2005) a raise of the minimum wage to 20 times 
the minimum wage or 154.080 euro. The reason is that 55% of the players in our first division are 
foreigners and a lot of clubs don’t want to invest in Belgian youth players anymore.  
ix In the Netherlands was the minimum salary for a 18-19 year old non-EU player 75% of the average 
salary or €218,246.25 and for 20 years and older 150% or €436,492.50. The Department of Education and 
Employment(DEE) controls the “quality” of the non-EU players. They demand some proof of the skills of 
the players(playing in 75% of the official competitive games of the national squad, country has to be in the 
FIFA top 50,…) to deliver a working permit or visa.(Dejonghe, 2004b:247-249) 
x The rule was in the first place for artists and athletes who came to Belgium for some performances like 
concerts or tournaments. A Belgian minister is the chairman of Telindus Oostende, a basketball team in the 
first division. To compete with in Europe he needed foreign players and he “asked” in 2002 to open this 
taxation law for basketball. To cover this real reason he changed it also for professional football.  
xi The tv rights in Scotland dropped from 17.7 million euro a year for the period 1998-2002 to 12.6 million 
in the period 2002-2004, in the Netherlands 47 million euro for the period 2001-2004? In the nearby future 
canal + will drop his participation with 30% (10 million euro) and canalise 50% of the money to the big 
three and in Portugal 45.3 million euro. (Dejonghe 2004b:207-210) 
xii Starting in 2005, with the new fiscal laws on ‘the non-profit companies’, debt to other parties than the 
league, players, coaches, the tax or social authorities, will be taken into account. 
xiii The season 2002/03 ended with 17 teams in the first division and KV Mechelen that had to relegate to 
3th division. In 200/02 ended SK Beveren with only 14 point 18
th and last but didn’t relegate. RWDM, 10
th 
and E Aalst(17
th) in the competition were declared bankrupt and relegated.  
xiv Anderlecht in Belgium en PSV in the Netherlands supported this until PSV dropped the idea pressured 
by Ajax and Feyenoord.  
xv The urban centres in Belgium are, according to their centrality, classified in a hierarchical urban system. 
There is one urban centre in level 0, the capital city, 3 in level 1, the major cities and 17 centres in level 2, 
the regional cities. 